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I. INTRODUCTION
"Professionalism," according to the Report of the American Bar
Association's Commission on Professionalism, "is an elastic concept the
meaning and application of which are hard to pin down."1 The organized bar
has equated the term with "the spirit of public service," 2 "training in
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. The
author is indebted to Professors Beverly Horsburgh, Peter Margulies, and Siegfried
Wiessner, and the author's wife, Mary Rae, for their helpful criticism of earlier drafts, and
to Robert Pierce for his able research assistance.
1 ABA COMMISSION ON PROFSSIONALISM, .... IN THE SPIRIr OF PUBLIC SERvICE: A
BLuEPRINT FoR THE REKINDLING OF LAwYER PROFESSIONALisM 111 (1986).
2 Id. at 1V(B)(5); see also ABA LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM D(1) (1988)
(approved by the House of Delegates, the creed states, in part, that "[M]y responsibilities as
a lawyer include a devotion to the public good.").
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Professional Responsibility," 3  and "promoting Justice, Fairness, and
Morality," 4 principles which, in the abstract, are difficult to oppose. The
report, of course, fails to mention that the elastic concept has been stretched by
the organized bar to include measures which strike at the very heart of the
adversarial process.
The adversarial mode of adjudication mandated by the Constitution in our
criminal proceedings has come under fire from other directions, as well. The
Rehnquist Court continues to produce opinions that tilt the delicate balance of
power between the prosecution and defense in favor of the state,5 and the
tendency of prosecutors and judges to tolerate the perjury of police and other
government witnesses exacerbates this imbalance. 6 In addition, the plea-
bargaining process has long ago replaced adversarial trials in the vast majority
3 ABA Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession, Narrowing the Gap, Legal
Education and Professional Development-An Educational Continuum, 1992 A.B.A. SEC.
LEGAL EDUC & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR 135.
4 Id. at 213 ("[A] lawyer can and should strive to serve the public and to further the
interests of justice, fairness, and morality.").
5 See, e.g., ALFRBDo GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MoDERN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE: A CRIcAL PEmPEcrivE (1992). Commentators have written extensively
on the crime-control model of criminal justice and the corresponding subordination of the
due process model. See Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U.
PA. L. REv. 1 (1964). As Professor Garcia observes:
What the majority of the Supreme Court apparently prefers is not a true
adversarial process. Rather, it is a pseudo-adversarial system in which one side has a
decided advantage. The majority is not interested in discarding or dismembering the
facade of the criminal adversarial process. Rather, its objective is to leave the elements
of the system in place while ensuring the correct result: the defendant's conviction. The
majority has successfully achieved its goals by partially depriving the accused of the
means with which to combat the prosecution. Therefore, the system is supposedly intact
while the scales are unevenly weighted in favor of the government.
GARCIA, supra, at 228.
6 According to the late Professor Irving Younger, who served as a federal prosecutor
and state court judge:
Every lawyer who practices in the criminal courts knows that police pejury is
commonplace.... And even if his lies are exposed in the courtroom, the policeman is
as likely to be indicted for perjury by his co-worker, the prosecutor, as he is to be
struck down by thunderbolts from an avenging heaven.
Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, 3 CRlM. L. BULL. 551, 551 (1967).
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of criminal cases. 7 These inroads into the adversarial process, however, differ
in a key respect from the current assault on the process mounted in the name of
professionalism: only the latter is shielded from view and from open debate,
thus curtailing the chances of restoring the integrity of our adversarial
proceedings.
Part II of this Article outlines the constitutional requirement of adversarial
criminal adjudication and exposes the dark underside of the modem concept of
professionalism: the attempted social control of women and minorities presently
entering the bar in increasing numbers, as well as the subversion of the
adversarial process and of the criminal defense lawyer's inherent role in the
process. Part Ill identifies the principal causes of these adverse effects: the
organized bar's efforts to subordinate counsel's allegiance to her client in favor
of a duty to the system in order to help rehabilitate the poor public image of
lawyers and thus preserve the self-regulatory nature of the profession; the
further erosion of counsel's client-oriented role by imposing a duty to influence
the client to pursue moral objectives; the bar's attempt to mold the professional
conduct of the women and minorities new to the profession to reflect the
collusive gentility of an earlier, more homogeneous era of the bar; the
profession's distrust of criminal defense attorneys and the professionalism
campaign's resultant attempt to expand the powers of the trial judge, thus
eroding the dominant role of opposing counsel in conducting the adversarial
search for truth; the failure of proponents of the current concept of
professionalism to recognize the nature and value of adversarial adjudication in
legal proceedings; and their failure to distinguish between the effects of their
proposed reforms on our criminal and civil proceedings. Finally, to promote
the integrity of our criminal trials in the face of modem professionalism's
concealed assault on the adversarial process, Part IV summarizes the
misconceptions and hidden agendas of which the organized bar's concept of
professionalism must be cleansed.
II. PROFESSIONAuSM'S HIDDEN ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTIONALLY
MANDATED ADVERSARIAL PROCESS
In the parlance of the organized bar, few terms are as popular or nebulous
as that of "professionalism." In reality, there are numerous concepts of
professionalism, each representing a particular set of values, interests, and
perceptions. Typically, the various groups and individuals involved in the
professionalism movement advocate some combination of these themes. Several
7 Sources estimate that approximately 90% of all criminal cases scheduled for trial are
ultimately resolved through plea bargaining. E.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL
PROCEss 135 n.151 (1993).
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common themes include: correcting abuses of the discovery process; adopting a
pro bono requirement for practitioners; providing the poor greater access to
legal services; and fostering a problem-solving approach to client representation
which emphasizes the use of informal, less costly, less adversarial means of
dispute resolution rather than a reflexive resort to litigation. Despite their high-
minded or innocuous ring, another popular set of themes undermines the
adversarial structure of our criminal trials as well as the fairness accorded
defendants and their counsel within the criminal justice system and outsiders
within the bar itself. These themes include: fostering greater civility among and
between lawyers and judges in their professional encounters; instilling in
lawyers a greater awareness of their duty to the system and to the public good;
counseling clients to adopt a moral course in legal matters; helping effect a
moral outcome in the matter; rehabilitating the poor public image of lawyers;
and the need to expand trial judges' authority over the manner in which trials
are conducted. To promote the various concepts of professionalism, the
organized bar has established innumerable programs, codes, and committees.
In retrospect, the assault on the adversarial process is not surprising. For
example, despite the constitutional mandate for adversarial criminal
proceedings and his oath to uphold the Constitution, former Chief Justice
Warren Burger, the individual most responsible for the development of the
organized bar's present professionalism movement, 8 announced in the
movement's initial stages that "trials by the adversarial contest must in time go
the way of the ancient trial by battle and blood." 9 Nonetheless, the adversarial
mode of adjudication is constitutionally required in our criminal trials.
The authors of the Bill of Rights were wary of the historical abuses of state
authority in inquisitorial trials, 10  generally distrustful of unchecked
8 As Chief Justice in the mid-1980s, Burger was a frequent critic of lawyer
incompetence. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274
(1982).
9 Warren E. Burger, Speech at the Meeting of the American Bar Association (Feb.12,
1984), quotation reprinted in DAvID S. SCHRAGER & ELZ.ABETH FROST, THE QUOTABLE
LAWYER 7 (1986). As the Preface to the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct states, the
Model Rules "embody a core conviction about the lawyer's role that is fundamentally at
odds with the American constitutional system." Theodore Koskoff, Preface to AMERICAN
LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDucr (1992) (promulgated by the American Trial Lawyers
Association (ATLA)).
10 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 479 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The Fifth
Amendment [was] written with the inquisitorial practices of the Star Chamber firmly in
mind .... ); Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67
NOm DAWM L. REV. 403, 427 (1992) ("The restrained power of American judges is
rooted in our general distrust of judicial authority which can be traced back to the
revolutionary period... ."). See generally A. ESMEIN, HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL
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governmental power, and familiar with the adversarial process and the jury
system of the common law. Thus, they built into the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments procedural rights of criminal defendants which, taken together,
form the adversarial mode of adjudication in our criminal proceedings. 1' In
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (John Simpson trans., 1913) (reprinted 1968).
11 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRMINAL PROCEDURE §1.6(b), at 37 (2d
ed. 1992) ("The structuring of an adversary system underlies many of the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights, such as the Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant to the assistance of
counsel, to confront opposing witnesses, and to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor.").
The Supreme Court has cited various combinations of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights as the basis of our adversarial system. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.
431,453 (1984) (adopting the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule in a
case involving an involuntary confession, the Court stated, "The Sixth Amendment
guarantees that the conviction of the accused will be the product of an adversarial
process.... ."); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) ("[A] fair trial is one
in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal ....");
Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976) (construing the limits of the privilege
against self-incrimination, the Court stated that "Mhe fundamental purpose of the Fifth
Amendment [is] the preservation of an adversary system of criminal justice."); Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In establishing the right of criminal defendants to pro se
representation, the Court stated:
The Sixth Amendment ... rights are basic to our adversary system of criminal
justice.. . . The rights... guarantee that a criminal charge may be
answered.., through the calling and interrogation of favorable witnesses, the cross-
examination of adverse witnesses, and the orderly introduction of evidence. In short,
the [Sixth] Amendment constitutionalizes the right in an adversary criminal trial to make
a defense as we know it.
Id. at 818; Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857 (1975) (considering the
constitutionality of a New York statute permitting a judge to order counsel to forgo closing
arguments in a nonjury trial, the Court asserted, "IT]he adversary factfinding
process... has been constitutionalized in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.").
See also AMERICAN LAWYER's CODE OF CONDuCT Preamble (1992) ("The legal system
that gives context and meaning to basic American rights is the adversary system.");
GEOFFREY HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACrnCE OF LAW 122 (1978) ("[Ihe Supreme Court
has substantially equated adversarial trial with due process .... "); JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL.,
CONSTrruIONAL LAW § 11.6, at 366 (1986); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS 564 (1986) ("[T]he adversary system... [is] presently part of the Supreme Court's
definition of due process that is assured to litigants by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments .... "); Leonard Rubenstein, Procedural Due Process and the Limits of the
Adversary System, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 48 (1976) ("'ilt is common to equate the
adversary system with the idea of due process itself.").
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contrast to inquisitorial trials in which the search for truth is almost exclusively
the responsibility of a judicial agent of the state, 12 the fact-finding role of the
judge in adversarial proceedings is minimized. Under the Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury, an independent panel of the defendant's peers serves as
fact-finder. 13 The balance of the Sixth Amendment procedural guarantees-the
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel, 14 to testify on her own
12 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (superseded by statute)
(ordering former President Richard Nixon, pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum issued by
the Watergate special prosecutor, to produce a number of crucial White House tapes, the
Court stated, "We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which
the parties contest all issues before a court of law."); MUrAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF
JUSTICE AND STATE AtrrHOmrrY (1986):
The adversarial mode of proceeding.., unfolds as an engagement of two adversaries
before a relatively passive decisionmaker whose principal duty is to reach a verdict.
The rmquisitorial] mode is structured as an official inquiry. Under the first system, the
two adversaries take charge of most procedural action; under the second, officials
perform most activities.
Id. at 3; HAZARD, supra note 11, at 120 ("The adversary system is distinctive for the fact
that the parties, through their lawyers, investigate the facts, frame the legal issues, and
present the evidence to a passive tribunal that then reaches [a] decision."); LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra note 11, at 35 ("The adversary model gives to the parties the responsibility of
investigating the facts, interviewing possible witnesses, consulting possible experts, and
determining what will or will not be told."); WOLFRAM, supra note 11, at 564 ("[In t]he
adversary system... parties initiate and control the definition of the issues and the
presentation of evidence."); Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial
Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1009, 1016-17 (1974) (stating
that, in our adversarial process, "Counsel for the state and accused play an aggressive role
in presenting and examining witnesses and in shaping legal issues. The judge is a relatively
neutral participant who assures that rules of evidence are satisfied and that the jury is
properly instructed on the law.").
13 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing, in relevant part, "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... ").
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (incorporating the right to a jury trial into
Fourteenth Amendment due process).
14 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing, in relevant part, "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.");
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring the states to provide counsel to
indigent criminal defendants); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (holding that the
right to effective counsel is a fundamental element of Fourteenth Amendment due process).
For the general standards by which counsel's effectiveness is measured, see generally
United States v. Chronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984).
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behalf,15 to compel the testimony of others, 16 to confront her accusers, 17 and
the derivative right of cross-examination' 5-interlock to create a process in
which opposing counsel are responsible for conducting the investigation and
presenting the evidence.19 The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination 20 further limits the coercive powers of the state. Reiterating the
Framers' suspicion of official power and their belief in the organic link
between justice and the adversarial process, the Supreme Court has consistently
acknowledged that "the Constitution recognizes an adversary system as the
proper method of determining guilt."21
15 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987) ("The right to testify on one's own
behalf at a criminal trial has sources in several provisions of the Constitution.").
16 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI (providing, in relevant part, "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor...."); see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (applying the accused's
right to compulsory process to state court prosecutions through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
17 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing, in relevant part, "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him. ... "); see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (superseded by statute)
(incorporating the right to confront witnesses into Fourteenth Amendment due process).18 Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404 (in which the Court stated that it "cannot seriously be
doubted at this late date that the right of cross-examination is included in the right of an
accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him").
19 HAZARD, supra note 11, at 120 ("[Ifu countries of the civil law tradition such as
France and Germany... the judge determines the law and finds the facts by his own active
investigation and inquiries at trial."); LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 11, at 36 ("Although
the prosecutor and defense counsel are given an opportunity to contribute, particularly at
trial, their role is far more limited than the role of counsel in the American process.");
G.E.P. Brouwer, Inquisitorial and Adversary Procedures-A Comparative Analysis, 55
AUSTRAL. L.J. 219 (1981) ("One of the main points of contrast between the French and
common law adversary trial lies in the role of the judge. In France, the emphasis is very
much on the judge's duty to arrive at the truth.... []t is he who carries the main burden of
interrogating the accused and witnesses."). See generally Ou-N H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL
LAW TRADrriON 124-32 (2d ed. 1985).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing, in relevant part, "No person... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself... ."); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (holding that the privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental
component of Fourteenth Amendment due process).
21 Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965) (holding that a criminal defendant
has no constitutional right to a nonjury trial). The Court has even stated that "the Fifth
Amendment outlaws" an "inquisitorial system of criminal justice." Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
"[Tihe adversary system," as Professor Laurence Tribe has observed, "has deep roots
in America's political and cultural heritage." LAuRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
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Moreover, the traditional principle-that criminal defense counsel's
primary loyalty lies with the defendant rather than with the court, the public, or
the quest for justice,22 and that counsel must zealously represent the defendant
within the limits of the law-did not develop on its own, detached from the
constitutional method of determining guilt, nor did the principle spring
originally from our case law or our codes of legal ethics. Instead, the client-
centered role of defense counsel is a corollary of the central premise of the
adversarial process: truth23 will most often and most completely emerge from
CoNsrrToNAL LAW §§ 10-19, at 764 (2d ed. 1988); see also HAZARD, supra note 11, at
120-21, 123 ("The adversary system has deep roots in the Anglo-American legal
tradition.... [It] is not only a theory of adjudication but a constituent of our history of
political theory.... Mhe adversary system stands with freedom of speech and the right of
assembly as a pillar of our constitutional system."); WOLFRAM, supra note 11, at 565 ("The
adversary system in the United States is culture-bound .... ").
22 The prosecutor, on the other hand, is obliged to seek justice rather than convictions
per se. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The United States Attorney is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty... whose
interest... in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done."); MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIONAL REsPONsIBILrrY EC 7-13 (1993) ("The
responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to
seek justice, not merely to convict."); MODEL RULES OF PRO;ESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8
cmt. 1 (1983) ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply
that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the
defendant is accorded procedural justice."); STANDARDS RELATiNG TO THE ADMINISTRATION
OF CUMINAL JusTICE 3-1.2(c) (1993) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not
merely to convict.").
23 Modern epistemology has doubted the existence of an objective, identifiable truth
independent of human perception. "The myth of objectivism has dominated Western
culture, and in particular Western philosophy, from the Presocratics to the present day. The
view that we have access to absolute and unconditional truths about the world is the
cornerstone of the Western philosophical tradition." GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON,
METAPHORS WE LIvEBY 195 (1980) (emphasis added).
Professor Richard Rorty typifies recent critics of the notion of objective truth:
To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences
there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human
languages are human creations.
Truth cannot be out there-cannot exist independently of the human mind-
because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but
descriptions of the world are not.
RiCHARD RORTY, CONTiNGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLiDAmrY 5 (1989); see also HAZARD,
supra note 11, at 122 (1978) ("ITrials are not quests for truth in a serious objective or
empirical sense, and cannot be. This is because truth is unknowable in any objective
[Vol. 55:855
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the friction between opposing advocates aggressively presenting their strongest
positions and closely probing the credibility of their opponent's position.24
Thus, the modification of the traditional partisan role of criminal defense
counsel would undermine the adversarial search for truth constitutionalized by
the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
The elastic concept of professionalism, on the other hand, has been
expanded to include principles and measures which, while seemingly noble,
would alter both the basic structure of the adversarial mode of adjudication in
our criminal proceedings and the traditional client-oriented role of criminal
defense counsel. According to the ABA Commission on Professionalism, for
example, "[t]he Bar should place increasing emphasis on the role of lawyers as
officers of the court."25 Or, as a federal court of appeals judge stressed to law
students in a Law Day address: judges and attorneys "must continue to be a
team .... [A]II of us owe our highest loyalty to the system." 26 Or, as a state
sense... and decision necessarily involves important elements of intuition, predisposition,
and bias."). Others have warned that:
the idea that there is absolute objective truth is not only mistaken but socially and
politically dangerous.... In a culture where the myth of objectivism is very much alive
and truth is always absolute truth, the people who get to impose their metaphors on the
culture get to define what we consider to be... absolutely and objectively true.
LAxOFF & JoIHNSON, supra, at 159-60.
24 See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (holding that, for purposes
of a civil rights action, a public defender does not act under color of state law in
representing indigents, the Court stated that "The [criminal justice] system assumes that
adversarial testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness.");
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (holding that a state statute permitting a
trial judge to prohibit closing arguments in a nonjury trial violated the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, the Court noted that, "The very premise of our adversary system of
criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the
ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."); see also Martin
P. Golding, On the Adversary System and Justice, in PHLOSOPHICAL LAW 98, 106 (R.
Bronaugh ed. 1978) ("[Aln adversarial trial promotes decisions that are well grounded on
both the law and the facts because each side will, with partisan zeal, bring to the court's
attention all the material favorable to that side, and, therefore, no relevant consideration will
escape its notice."); Irving R. Kaufman, Does the Judge Have a Right to Qualified
Counsel?, 61 A.B.A. J. 569, 569 (1975), quoted in United States v. Chronic, 466 U.S. 648,
655 (1984) ("Truth," as Lord Eldon, the Lord Chancellor of England from 1801-27, put it,
"is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question."). But cf Judith
Resnick, The Declining Faith in the Adversary System, 13 LrrIG. 3, 4 (1986).
25 ABA COMMISsION ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 1, at IV(B)(5).
26 Peter L. Fay, Law Day Address 5 (Apr. 15, 1986) (transcript on file with author).
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judge proposes in an ABA publication, counsel's "first duty [should be] to the
law and to the court. The second duty would be to make a diligent effort to
discover the truth. The third and last loyalty would be to the client." 27 Counsel
would become less the champion of the accused in the classic tradition of Lord
Brougham28 and more a guardian of the existing social order, thus tilting the
27 Rudolph 1. Gerber, Victory or Truth?, 16 LrnG. 3, 56 (1990). As an organizer of a
bar panel discussion on professionalism cautions in a national legal periodical, "[W]hether
zealous advocacy positions should be pursued, despite their negative impact on the system,
must be debated with the client." Richard Salomon, Professionalism, Should There Be
Limits on Lawyer Zeal?, NAT'L L.J., July 21, 1986, at 21.
28 One of the best known formulations of this view is Lord Brougham's, asserted in
1821 as he defended Queen Caroline in a dramatic divorce trial that shook England and
threatened to end the reign of King George IV. Peering directly into George's eyes,
Brougham declared:
[A]n advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows in the discharge of
that office but one person in the world-that client and no other ... Nay, separating
even the duties of a patriot from those of an advocate, and casting them if need be to the
wind, he must go on reckless of the consequences, if his fate it should unhappily be to
involve his country in confusion for his client's protection.
LORD BROUGHAM, TRIAL OF QuEEN CAROLNE 8 (1821), as recounted in LoRD
MAcMiLLAN, LAW AND OTHER THINGS 195 (1937). Lord Brougham presented his view of
the advocate's role to the House of Lords in the course of his defense of Queen Caroline.
King George IV, who was seeking a divorce from Caroline, had secretly married a Roman
Catholic prior to his accession to the throne, an act which, if disclosed by Brougham, would
probably have cost George the crown. Brougham's description of the lawyer's duty to his
client, which has since become a classic formulation, therefore served as a warning to
George and the Lords of the disastrous consequences of pursuing the divorce. WILLIAM
FoRsYTHE, HoRTENSirUS 389 n.1 (3d ed. London, J. Murray 1879).
In modem times, former Supreme Court Justice Byron White offered another well-
known formulation of the role of criminal defense counsel:
If [defense counsel] can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him
appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal course. Our
interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the State to its proof, to put
the State's case in the worst possible light, regardless of what he thinks or what he
knows to be the truth. Undoubtedly there are some limits which defense counsel must
observe but more often than not, defense counsel will cross-examine a prosecution
witness, and impeach him if he can, even if he thinks the witness is telling the truth, just
as he will attempt to destroy a witness who he thinks is lying.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1967) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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delicate adversarial balance of power between the prosecution and defense in
favor of the state. Those who would realign counsel's duties in this fashion,
however, fail to realize that, by fulfilling the lawyer's true role in the
adversarial system of justice required by the Constitution, counsel would
simultaneously serve the system and, in theory, the public good as well.29
While the proponents of professionalism may contemplate whether another
mode of adjudication better advances the cause of truth and justice,30 their call
for counsel to serve the system presumably refers to the present system.
Another measure espoused under the guise of professionalism would shift
partial responsibility for conducting the search for truth at trial from opposing
counsel to the trial judge,31 thus obliterating perhaps the most crucial
The organized bar traditionally espoused the client-centered model of lawyering as
well:
Mhe role of the lawyer as a partisan advocate appears not as a regrettable necessity,
but as an indispensable part of a larger ordering of affairs. The institution of advocacy
is not a concession to the frailties of human nature, but an expression of human insight
in the design of a social framework within which man's capacity for impartial judgment
can attain its fullest realization.
Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, Professional Responsibility: Report of the
Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. 1. 1159, 1161 (1958).
29 See, e.g., the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct drafted by the ATLA as an
alternative to the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Recognizing that the American attorney functions in an adversary system,
and such a system expresses fundamental American values, helps us to appreciate
the emptiness of some cliches of lawyers' ethics. It is said, for example, that the
lawyer is an "officer of the court," or an "officer of the legal system." ... In the
context of the adversary system, it is clear that the lawyer for a private party is
and should be an officer of a court only in the sense of serving a court as a
zealous, partisan advocate of one side of the case before it, and in the sense of
having been licensed by a court to play that very role.
AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CoNDucr Preamble (1992).
30 For an authoritative comparison of our adversarial system of justice and various
inquisitorial models that have evolved in civil law countries, see generally DAMASKA, supra
note 12; Mlijan Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84
YALE L.J. 480 (1975); Mhijan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two
Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506 (1973); John
H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 263 (1978).
31 Paraphrasing an observation of the late Professor Lon Fuller, the drafters stated in
the commentary to the Model Code:
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distinction between adversarial proceedings and the more autocratic
inquisitorial process. 32 The ABA Commission on Professionalism, for
example, formally proposes that "[tirial judges should take a more active role
in the conduct of litigation." 33 Many commentators and leaders of the bench
and bar echo this position, proposing, in the words of one scholar, "to shift
authority from lawyers to judges" with respect to "the presentation of
evidence, including the questioning of witnesses." 34
I1. CAUSES OF THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON THE ADVERSARIAL PROCESS
Before one might consider whether contemporary professionalism's erosion
of the adversarial process is reversible, the principal causes of the hidden
assault on the process must be identified. There are at least five such causes.
First, in an effort to rehabilitate the poor public image of lawyers and to avert a
public outcry for greater external regulation of the profession, the organized
bar, in the name of professionalism, has virtually abandoned the traditional
"client-oriented" model of lawyering inherent in the adversarial process in
favor of a model in which counsel's first duty is to the system and the
promotion of the public good. Second, other supporters of the movement,
including a number of legal scholars, seek to impose the additional duties of
reviewing the moral basis of a client's objectives and persuading the client to
adopt a moral course, duties which would further erode the adversarial nature
of our system. Third, the willingness of the professionalism campaign to
expand the powers of the trial judge erodes the dominant role of opposing
An adversary presentation counters the natural human tendency to judge too
swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known; the advocate, by his
zealous preparation and presentation of facts and law, enables the tribunal to come to
the hearing with an open and neutral mind and to render impartial judgments.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmrrY EC 7-20 (1969).
32 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
33 ABA COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 1, at TV(c)(1) (role of trial
judges in conduct of litigation). Although never formally adopted by the ABA House of
Delegates as official policy, the Commission's report was "highly influential" among state
and local bar associations, many of which produced similar reports or codes of
professionalism. STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES
AND STANDARDS 473 (1991).
34 Van Kessel, supra note 10, at 534-35; see also Gerber, supra note 27, at 56 ("[W]e
should consider adopting the continental inquisitorial system's emphasis on
cooperation... and a more managerial judiciary, with a lesser role for devious 'zealous'
[lawyers].").
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counsel in conducting the adversarial search for truth and is attributable, in
part, to the profession's repudiation of outsiders, including: the largely poor,
minority clients of criminal defense attorneys; cultural outsiders within the bar;
and criminal defense attorneys themselves. A fourth cause of the assault on the
adjudicatory process mandated by the Constitution is the failure of the
proponents of professionalism to understand the fundamental nature and utility
of adversarial adjudication in legal proceedings, a failure stemming largely
from their dearth of experience in the criminal justice system. Finally, the
professionalism movement has failed to draw a basic distinction between the
constitutionality and impact of reforming our criminal adjudications, on the one
hand, and our civil proceedings, on the other.
A. Professionalism as Public Relations. The Politics of Self-Regulation
The heritage of Bar associations, like that of all trade organizations, rests
initially in self-interest and protectionism rather than any noble spirit of public
service. 3
5
One of the strongest interests shared by lawyers is the continued self-
regulation of the legal profession.36 Indeed, the Preamble to the ABA's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct37 suggests that preserving internal regulation is
itself a reason to act ethically: "To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations
of their professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is
obviated." 38 From the bar's perspective, one of the greatest threats to self-
regulation consists of the popular image of lawyers as greedy and
unprincipled39 since that image might produce a public outcry for government
35 Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism", 41 EMORY
L.J. 403, 409 (1992).
36 The ABA effectively regulates attorney conduct through the promulgation of the
model codes of ethics adopted, with modifications, in nearly every jurisdiction.
37 Since their adoption by the ABA House of Delegates in 1983, the Model Rules have
been adopted, with variations, in at least thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia.
SELECrED STATUTES, RULES AND STANDARDS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 138 (John S.
Dzienkowski ed., 1994).
3 8 MODEL RULES ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1993). "All segments of the
Bar should... [r]esolve to employ all the organizational resources necessary in order to
assure that the legal profession is effectively self-regulating." ABA COMMISSION OF
PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 1, at IV(d)(7). "I will be mindful of the need to protect the
image of the legal profession in the eyes of the public." ABA LAWYER'S CREED OF
PROFESSIONALISM D(4) (1988).
39 See Pamela A. Rymer, High Road, Low Road: Legal Profession at the Crossroads,
25 TRIAL 79, 81 (Oct. 1989) (quoting Will Rogers remark that "I don't think you can make
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intervention. As a result, following the lawyer-dominated Watergate scandal
twenty years ago, the organized bar developed high-profile programs, a new
code of professional conduct, 40 and even a professional responsibility
component of the bar examination, 41 all designed, at least in part, to
a lawyer honest by an act of legislature. You've got to work on his conscience. And his lack
of conscience is what makes him a lawyer."). Public disdain for lawyers dates back to the
earliest days of the profession and, from biblical passages to cocktail party jokes, no group
has been more scorned. See Luke 11:46 ("Woe unto you also, ye lawyers! For ye lade men
with burdens grievous to be borne."); see also Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image ofthe
Lawyer: Refiections in a Dark Glass, 75 CAL. L. REv. 379, 379 (1987) ("Question: Why
did the research scientist substitute lawyers for rats in his laboratory experiments? Answer:
Lawyers breed more rapidly, scientists became less attached to them, and there are some
things that rats just won't do.").
Professor Post hypothesizes that public disdain for lawyers stems from the fact that, in
espousing causes in which they often do not believe, lawyers painfully remind each of us of
our own divided self:
We would like to believe that we are the master of our many roles, rather than the
reverse, but the persistent and unsettling example of the lawyer will not let us rest easy
in this belief .... The lawyer is the public and unavoidable embodiment of the tension
we all experience between the desire for an embracing and common community and the
urge toward individual independence and self-assertion; between the need for a stable,
coherent, and sincerely presented self and the fragmented and disassociated roles we
are forced to play in the theater of modem life.
Id. at 389.
Another commentator speculates that the public's failure to recognize the legal
profession's need for a process-differentiated ethics is another cause of the poor public
image of lawyers:
What is seen as the "decline" of ethics is in part the emergence of multiple ethical
systems, attuned to the performance of tasks more intricate and impersonal than those to
which the great sweeping principles of traditional ethical codes apply.... The present
Code of Professional Responsibility, because it is not embedded in an explicit
examination of the issues raised by the differences between professional and general
ethical codes, seems incomplete; and it leaves untouched one major cause for the public
distrust of lawyers and for lawyers' distrust of themselves.
Charles Frankel, Code of Professional Responsibility, 43 U. Cml. L. REv. 874, 883-84
(1976) (book review) (emphasis added).
40 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr (1993).
41 Many states require that bar candidates pass the Multi-State Professional
Responsibility Exam (MPRE), a standardized multiple-choice exam administered several
times a year; many other states incorporate professional responsibility questions into essay
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rehabilitate the public image of the bench and bar.
In the last decade, with the public standing of lawyers as low as ever42 and
an increasing number of government sting operations exposing corruption
among lawyers and judges, 43 the organized bar has intensified its efforts, under
the rubric of professionalism, to engender public confidence in the profession
and to preserve its self-regulatory nature.44 In the absence of a unified vision or
program, the proliferation of bar programs, academic conferences, centers for
professionalism, creeds of professionalism, and a variety of other efforts under
the catch-all label of professionalism, the movement resembles a large,
haphazard public relations campaign. 45 Bar disciplinary committees confirm
this notion by tending to ignore blatant cases of attorney incompetence,
indifference, or instability,46 while focusing almost exclusively on "act[s] that
will lower the bar's profits or bring lawyers into public disrepute." 47
In the bar's attempt to reshape its public image and to preserve self-
questions on the state portion of the traditional, two-day bar examination; some states do
both.
42 In a recent Harris Poll rating the "moral and ethical standards" of persons in a
number of occupations, lawyers finished second to last with a 25% positive rating. Only
members of Congress fared worse, inspiring confidence in 19 % of those questioned. Small-
business owners, for example, received a 64% rating. Grant Ujifisa, Who Do We Trust?,
READER's DIGEST 109 (Jan. 1993).
43 Including the "Operation Greylord" and "Operation Court Broom" trials for judicial
corruption in Chicago and Miami, respectively.
44 "'Professionalism' is now the accepted allusion to the Bar's ambitious struggle to
reverse a troubling decline in the esteem in which lawyers are held .... " Terrell &
Wildman, supra note 35, at 403.
45 "Among bar circles .... [the] common view is that the image of lawyers is
suffering and that something needs to be done. Specific suggestions run the gamut of public
relations techniques-from op-ed articles and TV appearances to school programs and a
new creed of professionalism, suitable for framing." Kenneth Jost, What Image Do We
Deserve?, 74 A.B.A. J. 47, 51 (Nov. 1988). "[Mn an era characterized by moral diversity
and economic competitiveness, it is very difficult to discuss any 'shared professional
aspirations.'" Terrell & Wildman, supra note 35, at 414.
46 F. Raymond Marks & Darlene Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession. Is
It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L. F. 193, 225.
47 JETHRo K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 204 (1978). In the quintessential
example of this tendency, at about the same time that the disciplinary committee of the
District of Columbia Bar was anxious to commence proceedings against Professor Monroe
Freedman for having exercised his First Amendment rights in arguing that criminal defense
counsel may be obliged to elicit testimony from a perjurious defendant, the bar ignored
examples of blatant instability such as that of a lawyer who had been discovered several
times defecating in the courthouse stairwells. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERs' ETHICS IN
AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM viii (1975).
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regulation, it has failed to distinguish between two reasons for the widespread
perception that lawyers are unprincipled. The first is the financial exploitation
of clients by their attorneys and other forms of attorney malpractice. A second
reason, however, is the apparent tendency of the public to equate criminal
defense lawyers with the unpopular Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights
they assert on behalf of their unpopular clients, rights toward which the public
exhibits widespread hostility. This viewpoint could be altered, to some extent,
by better educating society about the role of adversarial procedural protections
in curbing potential official abuses in law enforcement and the trial process,
and in securing the rule of law for all members of society. By failing to
distinguish between these two reasons for the public resentment of lawyers,
however, the bar's rehabilitation of its public image will necessarily require
changes in the traditional partisan role of criminal defense counsel which
ultimately will imperil the integrity of the adjudicatory process prescribed in
the Bill of Rights.
B. The Moral-Activist Model of Lawyering
Closely related to the misconception that the constitutional process is the
problem, another cause of the subversion of our adversarial proceedings is the
objective of many within the professionalism movement to further transform
the lawyer's role, imposing on counsel-in addition to a responsibility to the
system-the duties of exerting a moral influence with respect to her client's
objectives and of advancing the good of the public.48 Professor David Luban,
one of the leading advocates of the "moral activist" model of lawyering, speaks
of "a vision of law practice in which the lawyer who disagrees with the
morality or justice of a client's ends.., tries to influence the client for the
better" 49 and "to steer them in the direction of the public good." 50 Professor
4 8 The Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism, adopted by the ABA's House of Delegates
in 1988, asserts that "my responsibilities as a lawyer include a devotion to the public good."
ABA LAWYER'S CREED OF PRROFESSIONALISM D(1) (1988).
4 9 DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JusTIcE 160 (1988).
5 0 Id. at 171. Although criticism of the partisanship model is presently in vogue, it is
not a new phenomenon. The author of one of the first treatises on legal ethics in the
American system offered the following description of the attorney's role:
When employed to defend those charged with crimes of the deepest dye, and the
evidence against them, whether legal, or moral, be such as to leave no just doubt of
their guilt, I shall not hold myself privileged, much less obliged, to use my endeavours
to arrest, or to impede the course of justice, by special resorts to ingenuity-to the
artifices of eloquence--to appeals to the morbid and fleeting sympathies of weak
juries.... Persons of atrocious character, who have violated the laws of God and man,
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Michael Swygert refers to "good moral counsel" as a fundamental obligation of
lawyering and asserts that flfillment of the duty "involves raising and
discussing with the client moral issues and the moral ramifications of
alternatives." 51 In a third example, the ABA's widely circulated MacCrate
Report, Legal Education and Professional Development, asserts that
"when... some of the options available for solving a client's problem would
result in unfairness or injustice to others, the lawyer should counsel the client
to act in a manner 'that is morally just." 52 The moral-activist model, however,
rests upon several myths.
1. The Myth of Moral Neutrality
Proponents of the moral-activist model criticize rigorous partisan
representation as an abdication of moral responsibility for counsels' acts.53
are entitled to no such special exertions from any member of our pure and honourable
professions ....
DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OFLEGAL STUDY 755-56 (Arno Press ed. 1972) (2d ed. 1836).
As Dean Sharswood described counsel's role: "It is in some measure the duty of counsel to
be the keeper of the conscience of the client.... ." GEORGE SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL
ETHIcs 110 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1896).
5 1 Michael L Swygert, Striving to Make Great Lawyers-tizenship and Moral
Responsibility: A Jurisprudence for Law Teaching, 30 B.C. L. REV. 803, 814 (1989). Other
scholars have echoed this view. Even Monroe Freedman, for example, shares common
ground with moral activists: "[Clounselling with regard to moral as well as legal
responsibilities... is an essential element of the lawyer's responsibility." Monroe H.
Freedman, Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 41 EMORY L.. 467, 472
(1992).
52 ABA Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession, supra note 3, at 214. Known
as the Macerate Report after the chair of the Task Force that authored the study, the ABA
has recently provided a copy to all legal educators and first-year law students.
The ATLA, in the Preface to its alternative model code, The American Lawyer's Code
of Conduct, criticized the drafters of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct for
their non-adversarial view of the lawyer's role: "The Kutak Commission sees lawyers as
ombudsmen, who serve the system as much as they serve clients." Koskoff, supra note 9.
53 See, e.g., Joseph Allegretti, (hrist and the Code: The Dilemmua of the Christian
Attorney, 34 CATH. LAw. 131, 132 (1991) (stating that the traditional, client-oriented
lawyer believes that counsel is not "morally responsible for the means employed, or the
ends achieved" simply as long as no law or rule of ethics has been violated, and that this
belief serves to "insulate the attorney from moral scrutiny for his or her professional
actions"); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM.
RTS. 1, 6, 9 (1975) (asserting that the traditional partisan counsel is an "amoral technician"
evading "difficult moral dilemmas").
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While the heirs to Lord Brougham's view of the lawyer's role54 must recoil
from the thought of inflicting an unsolicited moral critique upon the accused, it
does not stand to reason that partisan counsel has failed to exercise moral
judgment or denied moral responsibility for the consequences of her actions.55
Indeed, a criminal defense attorney's decision to work within our criminal
justice system implies a fundamental value judgment about the system itself, a
commitment to the principles underlying the system, and an acceptance of
responsibility for the consequences of counsel's acts. Ultimately, the difference
in this respect between client-oriented and moral-activist lawyers is not the
adoption or failure to adopt moral principles or to acknowledge responsibility
for one's actions. Instead, it is a difference over which principles, which
system, and which lawyer's role will optimize the quest for justice. In other
words, since the adversarial system represents our society's belief in the
propriety of protecting individual liberties when they unavoidably conflict with
the maximization of social order, then simply because a criminal defense
counsel's zealous advocacy may result in the acquittal of a guilty party and in
that party's further victimization of innocent citizens, counsel's actions cannot
fairly be characterized as amoral or immoral. Instead, such actions represent
the calculated cost, albeit a substantial one, of preserving the constitutional
liberties of all citizens.
2. The Myth of Moral Consensus
In addition to undermining the adversarial process, the moral-activist
model speciously presumes that, within our culturally diverse society, a high
degree of consensus on the application of moral principles-or the principles
themselves-exists among lawyers and among society members. 56 While the
values of lawyers bore a closer resemblance when the bar was more
5 4 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
55 This debate has taken place over the history of the adversarial process: "[E]ven
though we admit that the advocate is ready to undertake either side of a cause for hire, it
does not thereby follow that he is venal nor that his attitude contravenes the principles of a
sound morality." GEORGE WARVELLE, ESSAYS iN LEGAL ETHICS 27 (1980) (originally
published in 1902).
56 See, e.g., Swygert, supra note 51, at 809 ("[A] normative morality of higher
principles includes reasoned beliefs held by most law-trained persons relating to human
dignity, human aspiration, procedural fairness, due process, equal treatment, fundamental
human rights, and so on.") Contra, e.g., Richard A. Matasar, The Pain of Moral
Lawyering, 75 IOWA L. REv. 975, 986 (1990) ("[W]e cannot lose sight of the fact that not
every lawyer shares the same ethical and moral vision and that we are a pluralist
profession .... ."); Terrell & Wildman, supra note 35, at 407 ("[Llawyering as a profession
exists largely because ofmoral ambiguity [within society] .... ").
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homogeneous with respect to class and race, the profession's increasingly
diverse composition broadens the spectrum of moral thought.57 In reality,
clients today could expect to receive diametrically opposed moral guidance
from attorneys on many or most matters. 58 As an example, a gay or lesbian
client seeking to adopt a child might be advised by one moral-activist attorney
that the client's goal is laudable and will help raise public consciousness about
gay and lesbian rights. The moral-activist attorney in the office down the hall,
however, might urgently advise the same client to renounce his or her immoral
lifestyle and, in order to protect society's interest in the traditional family unit,
abandon the attempt to adopt. Further, even if a moral consensus did exist, the
moral-activist model would fatally conflict both with the fundamental principles
of equal access to the courts and with the right to counsel: clients who
represent unpopular causes (e.g., hate groups, cults, and left- or right-wing
political activists) would be unable to obtain representation.
3. The Myth of Moral Enlightenment
The moral-activist model exudes arrogance and a paternalistic
condescension; it implies that clients are morally deficient, that attorneys are
morally enlightened,59 and, that in our constitutional democracy designed to
accommodate conflicting value systems, there is an identifiably superior set of
moral principles. Among all of the providers of services and goods, lawyers
have no special skill or reason for assuming the role of moral guide.60 Just as it
57 Indeed, feminists have described an alternative, care-based moral reasoning that
rejects the traditional rights-oriented approach. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VoicE (1982); Beverly Horsburgh, Redefining the Family: Recognizing the
Altndy'c Caretaker and the Importance of Relational Needs, 25 U. MICH. .L. REF. 423,
425 n.4, 426 n.5 (1992).
58 "[F]or every lawyer whose conscience may be pricked, there is another whose
virtue is tickled." Charles P. Curtis, he Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 16 (1951).
59 As bar leaders are fond of remarking when seeking to justify the monopoly they
hold as a profession, lawyers are supposed to be better than the common run of men
and women. . . Their character is supposedly investigated and certified. They are
subject to sanctions not employable against the lay public.
LIEBERMAN, supra note 47, at 35-36.
60The chief business of the lawyer is that of counsel as to legal rights, and the
maintenance, through the courts, of such rights.... He is not an expert as to moral as
distinguished from legal rights. He may know less of these than his client. There is, too,
such a difference of opinion as to mere moral ights that, generally, they do not
constitute a basis for advice.
1994]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNVAL
would be inappropriate for a drug store clerk to subject the unmarried
purchaser of condoms to a lecture on the immorality of premarital sex, it is
intrusive for a lawyer to assume the role of the moral conscience of a captive
client. The mere fact that an attorney's clients are often confused, distressed,
and easily influenced warrants sympathy, human kindness, and self-restraint,
not moralistic intermeddling. Often, "moral discourse" lapses .into
proselytizing, as illustrated by the remarks of Professor Thomas Shaffer, a
leading proponent of the moral-activist role:
The object of law office discourse as moral discourse is to serve the goodness
of the cient.... Born-again Christian lawyers whom I know tell their clients
about Jesus Christ as Saviour; some of them have told me that they ask clients
to pray with them.... I, who am a Christian, would say that my hope for my
client is that he respond to the redemption which God has accomplished for
him. And if that is my hope, then it is my duty, no doubt, to say something
about it. 6 1
4. The Destruction of Client Trust
Finally, the moral activist overlooks the social reality of the attorney-client
relationship. In addition to their alienation from the white, middle-class world
of the criminal defense attorneys who represent them,62 most of the
C.A. Kent, Legal Ethics, 6 MIcH. L. REv. 468, 474 (1908).
6 1 Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DANM L.
REV. 231, 247-48 (1979). "To the extent that one determines to conduct his practice as
moral conversation [and] his advocacy as moral discourse ... it is possible to be a
Christian and a lawyer." Id. at 252. See also Allegretti, supra note 53, at 137-38 ("The
Christian attorney is to bring his or her values into the workplace.... Lawyering can
be... an avenue for prophetic ministry.").
62 See infra part Im.C.1.
Minority defendants criticize public defender attorneys because they are white, middle-
class professionals who they feel have more in common culturally with the prosecutors
(and judges) than they have with the majority of indigent defendants, who are minority,
poor, and of a different social and economic class from that of the defense attorney.
CoRAMAE R. MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUEsTION OF COLOR 180 (1993), citing
National Minority Advisory Council on Criminal Justice, The Inequality of Justice 213
(1980). As a former public defender observed:
[Indigent criminal clients] do not know me from beans; they do not trust anyone
who works in the court system; I am white and they are usually black; they are not
paying me a dime and since when does that get you anything; even worse, they know
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predominantly indigent, disproportionately minority defendants brought before
our courts have been subjected previously to the criminal process, usually
many times, often having served time in our dehumanizing prison system, and
each time having been represented by counsel. While some of their attorneys
were hard-working, capable, and forthright, an appallingly large number were
indifferent, unprepared, and incompetent. 63  Not surprisingly, these
defendants-whether guilty or not-are distrustful of counsel, particularly of
those appointed by the court.64 In fact, in the eyes of many defendants, their
attorney is the most despicable member of the cast of characters who have
conspired to deprive them of their liberty: of all the figures in the courtroom,
only defense counsel pretends to be on their side.65 Under the circumstances,
that the people who are paying me are the same people, more or less, who pay the cops
and the D.A's.
Randy Bellows, Notes of a Public Defender (1983), reprinted in PHILIP B. HEYMANN &
LANCE LIEBMAN, THE SOCIAL RESPONsIBILrTIEs OF LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES 88 (1988).
63 As one veteran criminal defender observes:
[Many criminal defense attorneys] simply do not care. They do not investigate. They do
not file motions. They do not talk to their clients. They do not think through a defense,
prepare an opening statement, subpoena witnesses, or do any of the other myriad tasks
necessary to adequate representation. Sometimes, on the day of trial, they cannot even
recognize their clients. For a prosecutor, trying a case against one of these lawyers is
like shooting fish in a barrel.
Bellows, supra note 62, at 66.
6 4 See Bellows, supra note 62, at 89; JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 105 (1972) (describing a study in Connecticut in which clients of privately retained
counsel reported being satisfied with their attorney's performance five times more
frequently than clients of public defenders and court-appointed counsel).
6 5 As Professor Amsterdam observes:
It is not easy for a lawyer to convince a client to trust him or her when the client
has never seen the lawyer before and particularly when the lawyer is of a different race
or social background from the client's. As far as the client is concerned, the lawyer is
"the law," along with the police and the judge; the client has no reason to believe that
the lawyer is on the cient'r side. S/he will likely distrust the lawyer even more if the
client is indigent and the lawyer is court-appointed, since, in common experience,
things one gets for nothing are ordinarily worth nothing; and the only way to obtain
services one can count on is to buy them.
1 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL 5 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES 108
(1988); see also CHARLES E. SILBERmAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRiwMNAL JUSTICE (1978):
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the racist spectacle of a white, middle-class defense attorney acting as a moral
missionary to her indigent, minority client is likely to destroy any remaining
vestiges of client trust. Lacking such trust, counsel will find herself unable to
For the bulk of defendants-represented by Public Defenders-their attorney is at best
[viewed as] a middleman and at worst an enemy agent. Not only is the process of
criminal justice ... an assembly line dedicated to turning over cases ... , but the
defendant's own attorney is thought often to be himself a production worker on the line.
He is not 'their' representative, but in league with those who would determine the
defendants' fates.
... The defendants with whom I spoke tended to see their [court-appointed] lawyers as
representing the legal system to them, rather than representing them to the system.
"He's not my lawyer, he's the Legal Aid," New York City defendants often respond
when judges.., go through the ritual of asking the defendant whether the individual
standing alongside him is his attorney.
Id. at 305; CASPER, supra note 64, at 110 (quoting a convict who explains, "They got to be
on the state's side in order that they can work for the state."). In a 1980 opinion, the Alaska
Supreme Court reprinted a letter from a dissatisfied defendant to his public defender which
read, in part:
If I were paying you out of my pocket for your services you would provide more
[effective] actions as far as the case is concerned but, since your salary is paid by State
taxpayers you can afford to be undependable which is a large part of injustice. I can
understand now why such a large percentage of the men in Alaskan jails are there[:]
they were represented by Public Defenders .... Poor services for poor people ....
Coleman v. State, 621 P.2d 869, 881 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1090 (1981).
At least four other factors seem to contribute to the greater distrust of court-appointed
attorneys, a term used here to encompass both public defenders and private counsel
assigned on a case-by-case basis. First, defendants feel that, since court-appointed counsel is
paid by the state and "gets his money either way [i.e., win or lose]," he has little incentive
to fight hard. CASPER, supra note 64, at 110. Second, "paying a lawyer... gives the
defendant a sense of leverage over his attorney, a sense that he is in a position of some
autonomy." Id. at 112. Third, while there is evidence that public defenders and privately-
retained counsel (but not necessarily court-appointed private counsel) obtain similar
outcomes for their clients, public defenders seem to do less in terms of client relations. See
id. Finally, there is a perception among many defendants that public defenders are less
capable attorneys than private counsel. When asked in court whether they are represented
by counsel, defendants often respond, "No, I have a public defender." Id. at 113.
In reality, however, many public defender offices employ enthusiastic, capable young
attorneys who, to the extent their oppressive caseloads and limited investigative resources
permit, ably defend their clients. See, e.g., LSA J. McINTYRE, THE PUBLIC DEFmER
(1987).
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gather all of the facts from the accused necessary to present an adequate
defense. 66
C. Professionalism and the Subjugation of Outsiders
Occupying positions of power and economic privilege, the leaders of the
legal profession possess a vested interest in preserving the socio-economic
status quo. By shifting to the trial judge a measure of counsels' control over the
search for truth in criminal trials, and by weakening the duty of client loyalty,
modem professionalism helps maintain the state's control over an underclass of
66 "Whose side are you on, anyway?" is a familiar response to a public defender's
request during a pre-trial interview that the defendant elaborate on her version of the facts in
light of anticipated testimony by the police.
Although the system's interest in client trust has been subordinated to the largely
unwarranted fears underlying the client perjury rules, courts and the organized bar continue
to speak in reverent terms of the need for client trust. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 403 (1976) ("[If the client knows that damaging information could more readily
be obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from himself in the absence of
disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to
obtain fully informed legal advice."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REspoNsIBILrry EC
5-1, 5-2 (1993) state:
A fiduciary relationship exists between lawyer and client. The proper functioning
of the legal system requires the preservation by the lawyer of [client] confidences and
secrets .... [A] client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and
a lawyer must be equally free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his
client. It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his independent professional judgment to
separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant and unimportant.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 1.6 cmts. 4, 9 (1993) state:
A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer
maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The client is
thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to
embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter.
... To the extent a lawyer is required or permitted to disclose a client's purposes, the
client will be inhibited from revealing facts which would enable the lawyer to counsel
against a wrongful course of action. The public is better protected if full and open
communication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited.
See also Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960); Ellis-Foster Co. v.
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 159 F. Supp. 917, 919 (D.N.L 1958).
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poor, disproportionately minority criminal defendants.
1. Restoring the Collusive Gentility of an Earlier Period of the Bar
The organized bar has a dark history of utilizing the professionalism
movement to exclude or control outsiders who have entered the ranks of the
profession itself.6 7 To groups new to the bar, such as women and minorities,
and to other nondominant groups within the bar, terms such as professionalism
and civility are often understood as code words for an attempt to preserve the
gentility and homogeneity of the bar, deadening the impact of demographic
diversity on: the culture of practice, the "gentlemanly" limits on adversarial
zeal in criminal trials, and the social hierarchy of the bar during a period in
which its cultural composition is expanding. Suggestive statements abound in
the reports and creeds promulgated in the name of professionalism. The Final
Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit
observes, for example, that "the increased size of the bar [is] among the fuels
igniting uncivil litigation practices," 68 and that lawyers "miss the collegiality,
cooperation and respect that may have been present in earlier eras of practice
when bars were smaller [and] lawyers knew each other." 69
Individual advocates of professionalism are often less subtle, attributing
unprofessional conduct, for example, to the "belief... that entry into the
profession should be democratic," 70 and proposing, among other "reforms,"
that law school admission committees consider assessing the moral character of
applicants "through such personality tests as the M.M.P.I. 71 or Myers-
Briggs," 72 despite the culturally skewed nature of such tests. 73 In another
67 "Regarding their past, Bar associations exhibited all the classic 'negative' features of
a closed club." Terrell & Wildman, supra note 35, at 410.
68 143 F.R.D. 441, 445.
69 143 F.R.D. 371, 383. Similarly, the chair of the committee has noted that "[s]ome
older lawyers look back with nostalgia at their former practice. They remember the
collegiality [and] ... the general honorableness of [the] profession." Id. at 375.
70 R.. Gerber, Victory vs. Truth: The Adversary System and Its Ethics, 19 ARIZ. ST.
L.J 3, 24 (1987) (The author is presently a judge on the Arizona Court of Appeals.)
71 The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory.
72 The Meyers-Briggs Type-Indicator. Gerber, supra note 70, at 56. A study from the
1960s asserts that "[r]eligious background and national origin... [have] an effect on ethical
behavior...." JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETIcS 125 (1966). The author explains
that "the source of [a lawyers' degree of] ethical concern may be certain cultural values
held and transmitted by groups long established in our society and still committed to the
Protestant Ethic with its premium on strict morality .... " Id. at 147. Of greater
contemporary concern, however, in his preface to the "important book" containing the
study, Professor Geoffrey Hazard-noted legal ethicist, Director of the American Law
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example, the former Director of Professional Development for the prestigious
Atlanta firm of King & Spalding, who is now a law professor, and the present
managing partner at the firm suggest that "a decline in common decency,
attitudes, and standards" among lawyers stems, in part, from the increasing
"diversity of [the bar's] membership on every dimension: race, religion,
gender, and... sets of moral values."7 4
Statements such as these recall similar complaints of incivility and prior
professionalism campaigns by the organized bar which, like clockwork, have
arisen during earlier periods in which the ranks of the bar increased through the
admission of cultural outsiders. In the late 1800s, for example, the president of
the New York State Bar Association warned about immigrants "in almost all
our courts slovenly in dress, uncouth in manners and habits, ignorant even of
the English language, jostling, crowding, vulgarizing the profession." 75 When
a new wave of immigrants from Eastern Europe began to gain admission to the
bars of several northeastern cities prior to World War I, the profession's old
guard again called for more stringent standards of conduct. As the dean of a
prominent law school put it, these "shrewd young men,.., all deeply
impressed with the philosophy of getting on,... [view] the Code of Ethics
with uncomprehending eyes." 76 In addition, the bar sought to raise law school
Institute, and former Reporter for the Model Rules of Professional Conduct-praised the
author for revealing "more than we have ever known before about the ethical climate of the
legal profession... ." Id. at xxiii.
73 See, e.g., State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 17 (Tenn. 1990), affid., 501 U.S. 808
(1991).
7 4 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 35, at 403, 412. In response, Professor Penegar
states:
To conclude from these changes that democracy is the enemy of conformity to
ethical standards is preposterous. If lawyers no longer resemble each other as much as
they once did, or if they sound different, or do not exhibit identical social graces, there
is no basis in these outward indices of greater heterogeneity even to speculate that
attitudes toward or capacities for promoting ethically responsible behavior have
changed accordingly. It would reflect the rankest class consciousness to suppose a more
demographically diverse legal profession is one that includes more lawyers than a less
diverse one who are more likely to lie to courts, cheat their clients, violate confidences
or over-reach their adversaries.
Kenneth L. Penegar, The Professional Project: A Response to Terrell and Winan, 41
EMORY L.J. 473, 478 n.13 (1992).
75 N.Y. State Bar Assoc., 3 PRoc. 67 (1879), as quoted in JEROLD S. AUERBACH,
UNEQUAL JUSnTCE 51 (1976).
76 Harry S. Richards, Progress in Legal Education, AALS PRoc. 15, 63 (1915). The
President of the Carnegie Foundation, for example, referred to the new entrants to the
19941
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
entrance requirements, effectively eliminating the night law schools attended by
immigrants who generally lacked college degrees. 77 Writing of these periods in
Unequal Justice, Jerold Auerbach's classic treatment of the social evolution of
the American bar, Auerbach observes that, "[a]lthough lawyers spoke the
language of professionalism, their vocabulary often masked hostility toward
those who threatened the hegemony of Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture.
Professionalism and xenophobia were mutually reinforcing." 78
2. Distrust of Criminal Defense Attorneys
Professionally, criminal defense lawyers are themselves regarded as
outsiders by the wider bar. Remarks such as those of a founding partner of a
major New York law firm around the turn of the century-"It is a reproach in
our profession and in the community for a man practicing law in the city of
New York to be regarded as essentially a criminal lawyer" 79-reveal a
prejudice deeply embedded in the psyche of the profession. These sentiments
persist today and are manifest in observations similar to that of Judge Marvin
Frankel, a prominent critic of the adversarial system, who stated that "the civil
litigation bar.., has seemed more august and respectable" over time than its
criminal counterpart.80 Modem professionalism's diffusion of the criminal
defense attorney's loyalty, and its attenuation of opposing attorneys'
responsibility for conducting the search for truth reflect, in part, the legal
profession's long-standing distrust and repudiation of criminal defense lawyers.
In particular, the criminal defense bar is suspected of routinely "coaching"
profession as "morally weak." AUERBACH, supra note 75, at 107. As one writer has
observed of this period, "Until lawyers could discard their myths and memories, their
profession would teeter precariously between the world that was lost and the world that was
becoming-unable to relinquish one; unable, therefore, to enter the other." Id. at 18.
7 7 Former Chief Justice Harlan Stone once referred to this group, consisting largely of
Eastern European Jews, as "exhibit[ing] racial tendencies toward study by memorization."
Letter from Chief Justice Harlan Stone to Willard Bartlett, February 14, 1913, as quoted in
AUERBACH, supra note 75, at 107.
78 Id. at 99.
79 Letter from Samuel Untermeyer to William Armstrong, December 24, 1909, as
quoted in AUERBACH, supra note 75, at 26.
80 MARVIN FRANKEL, PARTISAN JusTICE 76 (1980). The profession's depth of disdain
for those who represent the accused is also evidenced by remarks such as former Chief
Justice Warren Burger's acrimonious characterization of the self-image of criminal defense
lawyers: "The noble aspects of our conception of criminal justice can be maintained without
having every defense counsel envisage himself as a white knight in shining armor out to slay
fascist-minded prosecutors and their witnesses." Warren Burger, Standards of Conduct for
Prosecution and Defense Personnel: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11, 16 (1966).
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clients to lie.81 For example, in a 1989 opinion permitting a trial judge to bar
defense counsel from conferring with the accused during brief recesses between
direct and cross-examination, even the Supreme Court asserted that "it is
simply an empirical predicate... that cross-examination of a witness who is
uncounseled between direct examination and cross-examination is more likely
to lead to the discovery of truth than is cross-examination of a witness who is
given time to pause and consult with his attorney." 82 In his dissent, the late
81 Probably the best-known example is a scene from the 1959 movie Anatomy of a
Murder, adapted from the novel of the same title by the late Justice John Voelker of the
Michigan Supreme Court (using the pseudonym Robert Traver). Counsel describes the
elements of the insanity defense to an attentive murder defendant in an obvious effort to
encourage the accused to fabricate his testimony at trial:
[lilt had been obvious to me from merely reading the newspaper the night
before that insanity was the best, if not the only, legal defense the man had.
"Mhe man who successfully invokes the defense of insanity is taking a
calculated risk, like the time you [the defendant] took the chance that the old
German lieutenant was alone behind his ruined chimney."
I paused and knocked out my pipe. The Lecture was about over. The rest
was up to the student. The Lieutenant looked out the window.... Then he looked
at me. "Maybe," he said, "maybe I was insane."
The Lecture was over; I had told my man the law; and now he had told me
things that might possibly invoke the defense of insanity. It had all been done with
mirrors. Or rather with padded hammers.
ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER 46-47 (1958); see also Bruce A. Green, "The
Whole Truth?":" How Rules of Evidence Make Lanyers Deceiof.d, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
699, 704-05 (1992) ("[Lawyers cause witnesses to recall things differently from how they
originally perceived them," writes the author. "[Bly molding the personality of their
witnesses, lawyers make them more believable than they would ordinarily appear.");
Rymer, supra note 39, at 80 ("Perhaps the most troubling symptom of all [among today's
attorneys] is a win-at-any-cost-indeed, a very high cost-mentality.").
82 Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 282 (1989). The majority had expressed the same
fear earlier in the opinion, stating that "[the reason for the rule is... to increase the
likelihood that [defendants] will confine themselves to truthful statements based on their own
recollections." Id. at 281-82. In addition, it inadvertently reiterated this notion by
suggesting that a trial court could impose a ban which limited communication to
nontestimonial matters. Ld. at 282. Despite its repeated concerns, the majority professed that
the ban on communication did not "[rest] on an assumption that trial counsel will engage in
unethical 'coaching.'" Id. The trial judge in Perry conceded that he issued the ban to
prevent defense counsel from "curing" the defects in Perry's direct testimony. State v.
Perry, 299 S.E.2d 324, 327 (S.C. ), cer. denied, 461 U.S. 908 (1983). The lone dissent to
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Justice Thurgood Marshall remarked, "[The majority's fears... are
motivated, at least in part, by an underlying suspicion that defense attorneys
will fail to 'respect the difference between assistance and improper
influence.'" 83 This mistrust is not a new phenomenon. Commenting over a
quarter of a century ago on an earlier case,84 former Justice William Brennan
observed, in response to the argument that the liberalization of discovery rules
in criminal prosecutions would encourage perjury, "[Isn't there a suggestion in
the argument, and a rather slanderous one, that the criminal defense bar cannot
be trusted?"8 5
The suspicion of rampant coaching is, however, greatly exaggerated. As
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals observed in a case involving several brief
recesses during the testimony of criminal co-defendants, the fear that criminal
defense counsel will coach her client to lie "rests upon more cynicism than is
justified by the performance of the bar.... We think the probability of
improper counseling, i.e., to lie or evade or distort the truth, is negligible in
most cases." 8 6 Moreover, the fear may represent, in large part, a tendency to
confuse the natural proclivity of interested witnesses to lie with counsel's
the South Carolina Supreme Court's affirmation of the ban cautioned that "[t]o allow
defendants to be deprived of counsel during court-ordered recesses is to assume the worst of
our system of criminal justice, i.e., that defense lawyers will urge their clients to lie under
oath." Id. at 328 (Ness, I., dissenting).
83 Perry, 488 U.S. at 292 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (paraphrasing, in part, Geders
v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 90 n.3 (1976)).
84 State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881 (NJ.1953) (announcing a rule that was effectively
overturned five years later in State v. Johnson, 145 A.2d 313 (N.J. 1958)).
85 William 1. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for
Truth?, 1963 WAsH. U. L.Q. 279, 291. Justice Brennan explained:
After all, isn't it the defense attorney and not the accused himself who will have
access to the state's materials? Whatever justification there may be for the
assumption that the desperate accused will try anything to escape his fate, the
notion that his lawyer can't wait to conspire with him to that end hardly comports
with the foundation of trust and ethics which underlies our professional honor
system.
Id. at 291-92.
86 United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
908 (1977); see also Perry v. Leeke, 832 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 1987) (in which the
dissent, referring to "the fear that defense attorneys would engage in unethical coaching,"
stated, "[w]e [refuse] to credit the assumption that many attorneys would flout their ethical
obligations.") (Harrison, C.J., dissenting), aff'd, 488 U.S. 272 (1989). But cf, e.g., John S.
Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277 (1989).
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traditional duty of zealous representation of the accused. 87
D. Failure to Appreciate the Need for Adversarial Truth-Finding in
Legal Proceedings
Another cause of the professionalism movement's assault on the adversarial
system is the failure of leaders of the bench and bar, and of legal scholars, to
understand the need for an adversarial search for truth in legal proceedings. Of
course, the mere fact that the Framers mandated the adversarial mode of
adjudication does not ensure truth and fairness in our criminal proceedings.
Judge Marvin Frankel's objection to adversarial truth-finding typifies those of
other skeptics:
Our leading religions may teach about loving our
neighbors.... forbearance, gentleness, and other fond virtues. In our arena
for secular justice, however, we enthrone combat as a paramount
good.... We are taught to presume as a vital premise the belief that "partisan
advocacy on both sides,"... will best assure the discovery of truth in the end.
We are not so much as slightly rocked in this assumption by the fact that other
seekers after truth have not emulated us.... [We] would fear for our lives if
physicians, disagreeing about the cause of our chest pains, sought to resolve
the issue by our forms of interrogation, badgering, and other forensics. But for
the defendant whose life is at stake-and for the public concerned whether the
defendant is a homicidal menace-this is thought to be the most perfect form of
inquiry. 88
Criticisms such as Judge Frankel's reveal that the special need for
adversarial truth-finding in legal proceedings is not fully understood. His
comparison of the truth-finding processes in medicine and law is meaningful
only if the obstacles to the discovery of truth in the doctor's office or the
scientist's laboratory sufficiently resemble those obstacles present in the
courtroom.8 9 In fact, the scientific method of direct inquiry differs in at least
three fundamental respects from the jury's pursuit of truth in our adversarial
system. First, doctors and scientists seek, through research, observation, and
experimentation, to identify the properties of natural phenomena. Unlike the
criminal defendant whose past acts are examined by the jury, however, the
87 Barbara A. Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 175, 184 (1983-
84) ("The root of the perception of lawyers as dishonest is the tradition of unmitigated
devotion to the client's interest.").
88 FRANKEL, supra note 80, at 11-12.
89 "mJustice is based upon the rule of law grounded in respect for the dignity of the
individual... ." MODEL CODE OF PROFESIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY Preamble (1993).
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phenomena examined by the doctor or scientist have no claim to the due
process protections which, taken together, form the adversarial quest for
justice.90
Second, while the scientific method of direct inquiry may be most efficient
in identifying truths in medicine and science, the more cumbersome adversarial
process is designed to meet the unique exigencies of discovering truth in
criminal trials. Although a particular fact in nature may be difficult to ascertain,
the obstacles to the discovery of scientific truth vary greatly from those in legal
disputes: nature, while infinitely complex, has neither a motive to lie nor a
memory to fade. If the proper questions are asked when inquiring into the
properties of an unknown substance, the answer will be divulged. On the other
hand, the answers provided by the petty thieves, overzealous police, and biased
witnesses who so frequently take the stand in criminal court vary from day to
day, from deposition to trial, and from direct examination to cross. The search
for truth in criminal adjudications must, therefore, be especially effective in
detecting falsehoods and confabulation. 91 Indeed, by permitting counsel for
each side to vigorously probe the claims of opposing witnesses through cross-
examination, 92 the adversarial process utilized in common-law systems is
conducive to exposing haziness in recall, careless or innocent inaccuracies, and
lies. "Cross-examination," as Dean Wigmore observed, "is beyond any doubt
the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 93 In
90 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
91 Confabulation occurs when one innocently "fill[s] in details from the imagination in
order to make an answer more coherent and complete...." Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S.
44, 60 (1987). Although, as here, the term is commonly used with respect to any witness, it
literally applies to witnesses whose testimony was induced through hypnosis. Id.
92 5 JOHN H. WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §1367, at 32 (rev. ed. 1974). Although the
presiding judge in the modified inquisitorial proceedings of civil law regimes may test the
credibility of a witness or the veracity of the witness' testimony, the system lacks the
vigorous cross-examination routinely conducted by the opposing side's advocate in
adversarial proceedings.
93 Id.
For two centuries past, the policy of the Anglo-American system of evidence has
been to regard the necessity of testing by cross-examination as a vital feature of the law.
The belief that no safeguard for testing the value of human statements is comparable to
that furnished by cross-examination, and the conviction that no statement ... should be
used as testimony until it has been probed and sublimated by that test, has found
increasing strength in lengthening experience.
... If we omit political considerations of broader range, then cross-examination,
not trial by jury, is the great and permanent contribution of the Anglo-American system
of law to improved methods of trial procedure.
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addition, the fear of detection and of a possible perjury prosecution presumably
deters many would-be perjurers, as does the well-known willingness of trial
judges to increase the severity of the sentences of convicted defendants whom
the bench suspects of having lied on the witness stand. 94 Finally, in instructing
jurors at the close of trial, the court often issues an explicit warning about the
credibility of the accused. Typically, the judge cautions the jury that "[i]n
weighing his testimony... you may consider the fact that the defendant has an
interest in the outcome of this trial."
A third distinction between the search for truth in science and in legal
proceedings is that the scientist cannot politically oppress the subject of her
proceeding-nature itself. The trial judge, on the other hand, is an agent of the
state which can and historically has discriminated against the subject of a
criminal proceeding-the accused. By delegating control of the investigation
and presentation of evidence to opposing counsel, the adversarial process offers
an important degree of protection from the abuse of official power. 95
In addition to the failure to understand the need for adversarial truth-
finding in criminal proceedings, many of the most visible advocates of today's
concept of professionalism seem to lack the instinctive feel for our process
acquired through years of experience in the criminal justice system. An
example of a distressing lack of understanding of both the fundamental due
process rights comprising the adversarial process and the mandatory nature of
the process appears in the commentary to the Model Rules of Professional
Id, see also Louis NIZER, MY LiFm IN COURT 327 (1961) ("If an opponent permits his client
to lie... [and] if I am prepared and persistent, such a witness cannot survive.").
94 See, e.g., Frank E. Schwelb, From the Bench: Lying in Court, 15 LrrIG. 3, 5 (1989)
("[I1f a criminal defendant has been fairly warned that pejury will be costly, and he still lies
under oath, this should be a factor in his punishment. As a trial judge, I would give
additional time to defendants who had clearly perjured themselves by fabricating
defenses.... ."). Defense counsel usually emphasizes this possibility to the accused during
the early stages of representation. Generally, counsel also points out that the testimony of
defendants is normally viewed with suspicion by the judge or jury and that the prosecutor
frequently ferrets out false testimony on cross-examination.
Although enhancing the sentence of the supposedly untruthful defendant seems to
constitute the summary punishment of the crime of perjury, it has been declared
constitutional. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) (im which the Court reasoned
that, since the "heinous" crime of perjury reflected poorly upon the possibility of
rehabilitation, a trial court may increase the severity of the sentence of a convicted
defendant who presented false testimony at trial).
95 As Judge Frankel observed disapprovingly, "[Ihe central feature [in adversarial
proceedings] of control by the parties rather than the public official on the bench, is a
corollary of the traditional mistrust of authority." FRANKEL, supra note 80, at 50.
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Conduct.96 The drafters express the fear that, because counsel whose client
insists on testifying untruthfully must seek withdrawal, an "unscrupulous
defendant" might intentionally trigger a series of mistrials in an effort to avoid
prosecution. 97  Remarkably, despite the obvious unfairness and
unconstitutionality of attempting to remove a defendant's right to counsel, the
drafters propose that "a second such [attempt] could be construed as a
deliberate abuse of the right to counsel and as such a waiver of the right to
further representation." 98 That fundamental Sixth Amendment right, as the
Supreme Court has made clear, cannot be forfeited or involuntarily
"waived." 99
E. Professionalism's Failure to Distinguish Between Criminal and
Civil Proceedings
A final cause of the hidden assault on our adversarial criminal proceedings
is the general failure of the advocates of modern professionalism to recognize
or acknowledge three critical differences between our criminal and civil
proceedings with respect to the impact of their proposed reforms. First,
although the adversarial structure of our criminal proceedings is mandated by
the Constitution, 1°° reforms espoused by the proponents of professionalism,
which ultimately alter the contours of the adversarial process, typically are not
restricted to civil proceedings. Second, the effect of these reforms on our
criminal and civil proceedings also varies. For example, while
professionalism's emphasis on informal, negotiated dispositions may represent
an efficient alternative to adversarial combat for parties to a civil dispute, it
9 6 The ATLA, in the Preface to the alternative American Lawyer's Code of Conduct,
described the drafters of the Model Rules as "a commission made up of lawyers who work
for institutional clients, in institutional firms,.., licensed to write prospectuses for giant
corporations, or to haggle with federal agencies over regulations and operating rights."
Koskoff, supra note 9.
97 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 3.3 cmt. 11 (1993).
98 Id. Even some commentators have supported the suggestion. See, e.g., Carol T.
Rieger, Cient Peijury: A Proposed Resolution of the Constitutional and Ethical Issues, 70
MINN. L. REV. 121, 147 (1985).
99 See Farretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938). The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he record must show.., that an accused was
offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not
waiver." Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962). And, as the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals has warned, "If in truth the defendant committed perury ... she does not by
that falsehood forfeit her right to a fair trial." Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 730 (9th
Cir. 1978).
100 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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merely intensifies the pressure exerted on criminal clients to plea bargain away
their formal adversarial rights. Finally, one of the most important interests
served by adversarial criminal proceedings-the limitation of the potential
abuse of state power by restricting the role of the trial judge-is less urgent in
civil proceedings because neither party is being prosecuted by the state.101
IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD ENLIGHTENED PROFESSIONALISM
To promote the integrity of the adversarial process and of the lawyer's role
within the process, and to ensure that our criminal proceedings conform more
closely to the requirements of the Bill of Rights, will require nothing less than
10 1 But cf. William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MIcH. L. REV.
1703, 1707-13 (1993). Professor Simon argues that, among supporters of the client-
centered model of the criminal defense counsel's role, the fear of the abuse of state
authority is exaggerated:
mhe image of the lonely individual facing Leviathan is misleading.... [R]hetoric
tends to suggest that the individual defendant takes on the entire state. But of course, the
state has other concerns besides this defendant.... It is more plausible to portray the
typical defendant as facing a small number of harassed, overworked bureaucrats.
Id. at 1707. By equating state authority in the criminal justice system with "a small number
of harassed, overworked bureaucrats," Professor Simon recognizes only the tip of the
iceberg, ignoring the ubiquitous nature of the state in the criminal justice system, including:
the authority of the court; the prosecution's strong advantage over the defense in
investigatory, scientific, and personnel resources, not to mention the procedural advantages
of the prosecution carved out of the adversarial process by the Rehnquist Court; pre-trial
detention through bail; and common prosecutorial abuses of power such as politicized
indictments and presentments and tolerance of police perjury. See also IsAAc D. BALBus,
THE DIALECrics OF LEGAL REPRESSION passim (1977) (Through a painstaking study of the
response of local courts to the mass arrests of blacks during urban revolts in Chicago,
Detroit, and Los Angeles in the 1960s, Professor Balbus documents the criminal justice
system's suspension of due process protections accorded defendants under the Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments.). As Professor Luban observes:
We want to handicap the state in its power even legitimately to punish us, for we
believe as a matter of political theory and historical experience that if the state is not
handicapped or restrained a ante, our political and civil liberties are jeopardized.
Power-holders are inevitably tempted to abuse the criminal justice system to persecute
political opponents, and overzealous police will trample civil liberties in the name of
crime prevention and order.
David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 1729, 1749 (1993).
For a more thorough rebuttal of Professor Simon's reductionist view of state power and
its potential abuse, see generally id. at 1730-52.
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a wholesale cleansing of the organized bar's present concept of
professionalism. An enlightened professionalism must be built upon social and
jurisprudential reality and must accept that: for better or for worse, the Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments prescribe the component elements of the
adversarial process in our criminal proceedings; similar modifications of the
adversarial process can produce widely varying effects on our criminal and
civil proceedings; two of the present goals of the professionalism movement-
subordinating counsel's duty of client loyalty to her duty to the system and
shifting a portion of the responsibility for the search for truth from opposing
counsel to the trial judge-alter the structure of the criminal process; the moral-
activist role of counsel espoused by many supporters of the movement further
undermines the client-oriented lawyer's role inherent to the criminal
adjudicatory process and, in a pluralistic society, represents a form of moral
tyranny; the assault on the criminal process represents, in part, the organized
bar's repudiation of criminal defense attorneys and its attempt to shape the
professional conduct of the women and minorities presently entering the
profession to reflect the collusive gentility of a prior and more homogeneous
era of the bar; the profession's exaggerated distrust of the criminal defense bar
also reflects a tendency to confuse the mendacity of defendants' testimony with
the lawyer's traditional duty of zealous advocacy; and finally, the adversarial
mode of seeking truth reflects a healthy independence from the state-dominated
process in inquisitorial trials and is uniquely suited to ferreting out the truth as
described by contending witnesses. To become worthy of its noble rhetoric of
serving justice and the public good, modem professionalism must clear away
the debris of its present misconceptions, prejudices, and hidden agendas, and
redefine itself as guardian of the uniquely American quest for truth and fairness
mandated by the Constitution in our criminal proceedings.
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